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Unequal Protection: Public Benefits,
Public Policy, and Aliens
by Carolyn Waller*
The modern government, whether federal, state, or local, distributes
many types of benefits. Not infrequently, benefit funds provided by one
level of government are administered by another level or even by a private entity. Whether these benefits are available to an alien admitted to
the United States for lawful permanent residence and how they affect
that person's residency status depends not only on the need for assistance
but also on the source. The access of lawfully admitted permanent resident aliens to public benefits is determined, at least in part, by a set of
contradictory legal doctrines and social policies that are unique to immigration law.
Within the United States there are conflicts in policy and in law.
With respect to policy, on the one hand there has been a traditional reluctance to admit into this country those persons considered likely to become a public charge.' On the other hand, there has existed a longstanding commitment to provide a haven for the world's refugees and
displaced persons. 2 The legal contradiction is one created by the courts,
which have held in most cases that under the equal protection and due
process clauses of the fourteenth amendment 3 the state government has
the burden of justifying an attempted distinction between classes of persons on some rational basis, whereas when a distinction is made between
classes on the basis of race, 4 national origin, 5 or alienage, 6 a compelling
state interest must be shown. A different and disquieting rule, however,
is applicable when a distinction based on alienage is made by the federal
government. In federal cases, courts have upheld discriminatory legislation, relying on the plenary powers inherent in sovereignty according to
* Assistant Editor InterpreterReleases, American Council for Nationalities Service; Mem-

ber, District of Columbia Bar; B.A. 1959, Bucknell University; M.A. Spanish Education 1960,
University of Wisconsin at Madison; J.D. 1977, Antioch School of Law.
I 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2.39 (1980).
2 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, REVIEW OF U.S. REFUGEE PROGRAMS AND POLICIES 1 (1979) (report prepared at the request of Senator Edward M.
Kennedy, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary).

3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
5 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
6 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1975).
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accepted ideas of international law' or on the power to regulate foreign
commerce. 8 These plenary powers are described by one court as follows:
Policies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here
are peculiarly concerned with the political conduct of government ....
[T]hat the formulation of these policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly embedded in the legislative and
judi9
cial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government.
According to early cases, Congress may exclude or deport aliens because
it dislikes the color of their eyes or skin.' 0 An entire race may be excluded; and, if it chooses, Congress may cut off all immigration to the
United States. I I More recently, this congressional power has been extended beyond immigration per se to permit the exclusion from public
benefit programs of aliens who have been lawfully admitted for permanent residence. 12 As a result ofjudicial determinations that Congress has
a plenary power over immigration, a discrepancy has developed between
those rights of lawful permanent resident aliens which are protected by
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment from infringement by the states and those rights which are protected by the due process clause of the fifth amendment 13 from infringement by the federal
government. Thus, the legal contradiction with regard to aliens and
public benefits has taken the form of a distinction between what restrictions may be imposed on aliens by states in their administration of state
and federal programs and what restrictions may be imposed by Congress
14
in programs administered by the national government.
As to programs administered by the states, federal statutes such as
42 U.S.C. § 2000d, which prohibits discrimination based on race, color,
or national origin in any programs receiving federal financial assistance, 15 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 have been used effectively to
combat discrimination against aliens. Section 1981 guarantees "the full
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons
and property.
,,1'6 and section 1983 provides a relief mechanism for
7 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).

United States tx rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904). The commerce power,
however, is subject to the fifth amendment. Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1939).
8

9 Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954).
10 Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78 (1914); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698
(1893); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889);
United States rx rtel. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 187 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1951), aJ'd, 342 U.S. 580

(1952).
I Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78, 88 (1914).

Segeneraly M. KONVITZ, THE ALIEN AND

THE ASIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW (1946).

12 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
I3 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
14 National public benefit programs include Social Security, Medicare, the Earned In-

come Tax Credit, and Supplemental Security Income. Federal programs include Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Refugee Assistance, Food Stamps, Medicaid, and

Unemployment Insurance. State programs include Workers' Compensation and General Assistance.
15 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
16 Id § 1981.
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"any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof. . .,"I whose rights have been violated under color of law.
In addition to the statutes mentioned above, the equal protection
and due process clauses of the Constitution and the plenary power of
Congress over immigration have been used to strike down state legislation denying welfare benefits to aliens lawfully admitted for permanent
residence. In Graham v. Richardson,' 8 the Supreme Court considered two
related cases involving Arizona and Pennsylvania statutes. The Graham
case involved the state of Arizona's participation in a federal welfare program and a state statute which limited assistance to persons who are either U.S. citizens or who had resided in the United States a total of
fifteen years. Sailer v. Leger, 19 the companion case, was concerned with
the state of Pennsylvania's general assistance program, a program which
received no federal support and which required, among other things,
that benefits be provided only to needy persons who were citizens of the
United States. Both plaintiffs qualified for aid except for the fifteen year
residency requirement in the case of Mrs. Richardson and the citizenship
requirement in the case of Mrs. Leger. Relying primarily on Takahashi v.
Fish and Game Commission20 and Shapiro v. Thompson ,2 t the Court found
that:
Congress has broadly declared as federal policy that lawfully admitted
resident aliens who become public charges for causes arising after their
entry are not subject to deportation, and that as long as they are here
benefit of all state laws for the
they are entitled to the full and 2equal
2
security of persons and property.

Therefore, the Court stated that, "state laws that restrict the eligibility of
aliens for welfare benefits merely because of their alienage conflict with
these overriding national policies in an area constitutionally entrusted to
the Federal Government. '23 Thus, the Court held these restrictions unconstitutional.
In addition to finding that the restrictions violated equal protection
mandates, the right to travel, and federal policy, the Court also found a
violation of section 1981.24 These statutory and constitutional holdings
were shortly reaffirmed in Zarate v. State Department of Health andRehabiltation,25 in which the Federal District Court for the Southern District of
17 Id. § 1983.
18 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
19 Id
20 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (California statute that barred the issuance of commercial fishing
licenses to persons "ineligible for citizenship," including alien Japanese residents, violated the
Constitution and federal law).
21 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and District of Columbia statutes that
denied welfare assistance to residents who had not resided in the jurisdiction for at least one
year preceding their applications for assistance violated the equal protection clause and right of
interstate movement).
22 403 U.S. at 378.
23 Id

Id at 377.
25 347 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. Fla. 1971), af'dmem., 407 U.S. 918 (1972).
24

4

N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

Florida said that the state of Florida was precluded by virtue of sections
2000d, 1981, and 1983 from conditioning the receipt of welfare either on
a beneficiary's possession of U.S. citizenship or on an alien beneficiary's
residence in this country for a certain number of years. Six years later
the Supreme Court struck down on similar grounds state legislation deto lawful permanent
nying educational assistance in higher education 26
resident aliens not interested in becoming citizens.
In each of these cases the Supreme Court found that state classifications based on alienage are inherently suspect and can be upheld only if
there is a compelling state interest. In contrast, federal classifications
based on alienage are reviewed under a rational basis test. While an
alien is entitled to significant fifth amendment protection by the national
government, the protection is not as extensive as that accorded to citizens. Thus, eligibility requirements for federal public benefits which effectively discriminate against aliens have been approved. In Mathews v.
Diaz, 27 a unanimous Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a
requirement that restricts eligibility for coverage under a Medicare program to aliens who have been permanent residents for five years. In
some cases social security benefits are suspended for otherwise qualified
aliens who remain outside the United States for over six months. 28 Also,
under section 1611 (f) of the Social Security Act, 29 Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) payments are suspended for citizens and aliens alike for
any entire month which the recipient spends outside the United States.
This restriction has been upheld by the Supreme Court in Cakfano v.
Aznavorian.30 The contradictory lines of cases discussed above and exemplified by Graham v. Richardson and Matthews v. Diaz form the basis for one
of the few clear rules that exists today regarding the eligibility of lawful
permanent resident aliens for public benefits: while states must provide
aliens with the equal protection dictates of the fourteenth amendment,
the protections of the fifth amendment are limited only by the plenary
powers of the federal government in the field of immigration. 3 '
26 Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
27 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
28 42 U.S.C. § 402(t) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). This section provides for suspension of
benefits after six months, except in cases where the beneficiary is a citizen of a country which
has a social insurance system under which a U.S. citizen could qualify and could continue to
qualify while outside that country regardless of the duration of the absence.
29 42 U.S.C. § 1382(0 (1976). This program succeeded the federal categorical assistance
program for aged, blind, and disabled adults in January 1974. 42 U.S.C. § 1381 (1976); see
H.R. REP. No. 92-231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 25, rrpnintedt'n [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS

4989, 5012. To be eligible a claimant must meet an income test and be either blind, disabled, or
65 years of age or over. 42 U.S.C. § 1382 (1976).

30 439 U.S. 170 (1978) (also noting different standard applicable to federal as opposed to
state restrictions on international travel, a rational basis test as opposed to strict scrutiny). See
generally Note, Califano v. Aznavorian. Social Secuniy Residence RequirmentDoes Not Impair the Right of
International Travel, this issue.

31 In Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979), and Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978),
the Court held that the positions of teacher and state trooper are so involved with the operations
of the state as a governmental entity that the "close judicial scrutiny" test should not apply.
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The Supreme Court in Mathews v. Dzaz explicitly recognized that
the congressional power to discriminate against aliens in regard to public
benefits can be used to discourage immigration.
Appellees also gain no support from Washington v. Legrant, 394 U.S. 618,
a case decided with Shapiro v.Thompson. Legrant involved a congressionally imposed requirement of one year's residence within the District
of Columbia for receipt of welfare benefits. As in Shapiro v.Thompson, no
question of alienage was involved. We held that the requirement violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment for the same reasons that the state-imposed durational residency requirements violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 394 U.S. at
641-642. Unlike the situation in Shapiro and Legrant, the durational residency requirements in this case could at most deter only the travel of
the
aliens into the United States. The power of Congress to prevent
32
travel of aliens into this country cannot seriously be questioned.

Congress' discriminatory power concerning aliens has thus recently
been judicially determined to extend beyond immigration per se. This
determination has increased the likelihood of contradictory social policies by making it possible for national laws in areas other than immigration to reflect the continuing tension between a desire to exclude paupers
and sympathy for the underprivileged and oppressed. In the past this
tension has been reflected primarily in relatively harsh statutory provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that are ameliorated
by generous administrative and judicial interpretations. Thus, the present statute provides not only for the exclusion of persons likely to become
.a public charge, 33 but also for the deportation of anyone who "in the
opinion of the Attorney General, has within five years after entry become
a public charge from causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen after
entry." 34 Juxtaposed against this language is the view that, while there
are no fixed standards, poverty alone will not disqualify an alien from
admission as an immigrant if that person is willing to work and free from
serious mental and physical defects. 35 In the same manner, the public
However, subsequent cases indicate that so far both state and lower federal courts are applying
this "governmental function" exception narrowly. See Ramirez v. Sloss, 615 F.2d 163 (5th Cir.
1980); Andrade v. Nadel, 477 F. Supp. 1275 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); DeMalherbe v. International
Union of Elevator Constructors, 476 F. Supp. 649 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Ruiz-Cano v. County of
San Diego, 98 Cal. App. 3d 803, 159 Cal. Rptr. 602 (1979); Nielsen v. Washington State Bar
Ass'n, 90 Wash. 2d 818, 585 P.2d 1191 (1978); Wyoming v. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 601
P.2d 174 (Wyo.1979).
In another recent development, the limitations of the fifth amendment protections were
expanded when the Supreme Court refused to review Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C.
Cir. 1979), cort. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
had held that distinctions on the basis of nationality may be drawn in the field of immigration
by the Congress or the Executive, rejecting the finding by the district court that ordinarily it is
the Congress, and not the Executive Branch, which is empowered by the constitution to decide
immigration policy.
32

426 U.S. at 86 n.26.

33

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(15) (1976).
Id. § 1251(a)(8).

4

35 In re Martinez Lopez, 10 I.& N. Dec. 409 (Attorney General 1964); C. GORDON & H.
RosENFIELD,supra note 1,at § 2.39d.
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charge deportation provision has been substantially mitigated over the
years. Relying on early court decisions, 36 the Board of Immigration Appeals has laid down three elements which must be present before an alien
welfare recipient may be declared a public charge for deportation purposes: (1) repayment must be required by law, (2) there must be a request for payment, and (3) there must be a failure to pay. 37 Until
recently, therefore, the potentially harsh effects of the public charge deportation and exclusion provisions have been largely avoided, and in
general lawful permanent resident aliens have had access to public benefit programs without the receipt of assistance affecting their status.
Under the pressure of a deteriorating economy and increasing antialien sentiment this situation has begun to change, and efforts have begun to restrict the access of aliens to public benefit programs. One of the
first developments occurred in May 1977 with the introduction of House
Bill 7200.38 As originally introduced, it contained a section which would
require a sponsor's income and resources to be imputed to an alien applying for Supplemental Security Income (SSI). In June the Bill passed
the House and was sent to the Senate Finance Committee where another
section was added which would have amended section 241(a)(8) of the
INA 39 to redefine public charge as including anyone receiving aid under
Titles 1,40 X, 4 1 XIV, 42 XVI, 4 3 or Part A of Title IV 4 4 of the Social Security Act. Although the Bill eventually died, it was the first of many attempts to restrict access not only to SSI, but also to Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) and to Medicaid. 45 SSI has been the primary target, however, because of a belief on the part of many that large
numbers of elderly aliens, for whom U.S. citizen relatives had signed affidavits of support, were taking advantage of the program.
The attention given SSI was increased in early 1978 when the General Accounting Office released an alarmist report regarding the extent
to which newly arrived elderly aliens were taking advantage of this pro36 Nocchi v. Johnson, 6 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1925); Exparte Kichmiriantz, 283 F. 697 (N.D.

Cal. 1922).
37 In re B-, 3 I. & N. Dec. 323 (Attorney General 1948). Cf In re C-, 2 I. & N. Dec. 538

(Board of Immigration Appeals 1946) (alien cannot be declared a public charge when state has
not requested payment for alien's care in a public institution within five years after entry); In re
U-, 2 I. & N. Dec. 78 (Board of Immigration Appeals 1944) (when payment is tendered for
alien's care but is refused by state, alien is not a public charge).
38 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
39 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(8) (1976).
40 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-306 (1976).
41 Id §§ 1201-1206.
42 Id §§ 1351-1355.
43 Id §§ 1381-1383c (1976) (amended 1980).
44 Id §§ 601-610 (1976) (amended 1980).
45 During the first session of the 96th Congress at least 22 bills were introduced which
would have affected the access of aliens to various public benefit programs. AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR NATIONALITIES SERVICE, 57 INTERPRETER RELEASES, Jan. 17, 1980; 56 INTERPRETER

RELEASES, July 9, 1979; 56 INTERPRETER RELEASES, March 7, 1979.
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gram. 46 Although a critique of this report done at the request of Representative George Brown (D-Cal.)4 7 showed it to be seriously flawed, it
nevertheless became the single most influential factor in the eventual
passage of restrictive provisions as part of the Social Security Disability
Amendments of 1980.48 This legislation amends section 1614() of the
Social Security Act to provide that after September 30, 1980, sponsored
aliens applying for SSI benefits for the first time will have, with a few
resources deemed to them for the
exceptions, the sponsor's income and
49
three year period following arrival.
At the same time as these legislative initiatives were being made in
Congress, permanent resident aliens who received SSI benefits in the
United States and then temporarily proceeded abroad were being held
by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for deferred inspection upon their return. 50 Beginning in late 1978 or early 1979, exclusion proceedings were begun in some cases on the theory that the receipt
of SSI benefits made the aliens inadmissible as likely to become a public
charge within the meaning of section 212(a)(15) of the INA. 5 1 The decision to proceed against such aliens apparently was based on the rationale
of In re Vindman ,52 a 1977 decision by an INS Regional Commissioner
that a 66 year old alien who had been paroled as a refugee in 1973 was
properly denied adjustment to the status of lawful permanent resident.
He was held to be inadmissible under section 212(a)(15) because he had
for employment and had been receiving SSI
no employment or prospects
53
benefits for three years.
46 COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
NUMBER OF NEWLY ARRIVED ALIENS WHO RECEIVE SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME
NEEDS To BE REDUCED (1978).
47 Memorandum from Staff of Rep. George E. Brown to Rep. George E. Brown (October
11, 1978) (copy on file at the North Caroltna Journalof International Law and Commercial Regulation).
48 Pub. L. No. 96-265, § 504(a)-(b), 94 Stat. 471 (1980) (to be codified in 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1382c, 1382j).
49 Id (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382c(f)(3), 1382j()(2)).
50 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (1976). Deferred inspection occurs when an immigration officer at a
port of entry suspects that an alien may be admissible. The officer may parole the alien into the
country, as opposed to admitting the person, in order that further inquiry may be made and an
exclusion hearing held if necessary. Id.
51 Id. § 1182(a)(15). The power to refuse admission to aliens previously admitted as lawful permanent residents is derived from 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(l)-(33) (West 1970 & Supp. 1980).
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1976) defines "entry" as "any coming of an alien into the United States,
from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession whether voluntarily or otherwise
.
This
.. strict definition of "entry" evolved judicially and was expressed most restrictively
in United States ex rl. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422 (1933), in which the Court upheld deportation of a permanent resident alien who, after 24 years in the United States, was held to be
excludable on his return from a brief visit to Cuba because of a counterfeiting charge in the
United States.
52 16 I. & N. Dec. 131 (Regional Commissioner 1977).
53 At the time In re Vindman was adjudicated, section 212(d)(5) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5) (amended 1980), read as follows:
The Attorney General may in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest any alien applying for admission to the
United States, but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission

8
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Responding to complaints that certain groups were being singled
out for exclusion on the basis of receipt of SSI as well as to the fact that
the Social Security law permits SSI to continue uninterrupted for absences of thirty days or less, 54 the INS, in June 1979, issued internal
guidelines55 recommending that consideration be given to the rationale
used by the Supreme Court in Rosenberg v. Fleu/l"5 6 in order to mitigate the
harsh effects of the reentry doctrine. Based on the new policy directive,
the Board of Immigration Appeals in October 1979 ordered the admission of a returning resident who had received SSI benefits prior to his
temporary departure. 57 Its decision was based on two alternative
grounds. First, applying the Fleuti"rule, the alien's departure had not
been meaningful and therefore there was no "entry" upon his return.
Second, even if the trip had interrupted the alien's permanent residence,
the INS had not sustained its burden of proving he was likely to become
a public charge because he had terminated his SSI benefits and had obtained pledges of support from four relatives in the United States. 58 A
later case, In re Vallecer, 59 was resolved without a formal exclusion hearing when the INS was persuaded to look at the "entry" issue first and not
at the Vallecers' SSI recipiency. As a result, the Vallecers did not have
to terminate SSI benefits or file new affidavits of support. 60 Following
this agreement, the INS apparently stopped the practice of holding returning SSI recipients for deferred inspection. The well-established
Fleuti rule and the conflict with social security regulations which permit
benefits to continue during absences from the country of thirty days or
of the alien and when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the
Attorney General, have been served the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall
continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for
admission to the United States.
Since In re Vz~zdman, the INA has been amended by the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212,
94 Stat. 102 (to be codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) to restrict the use of the parole
power for the admission of refugees, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(d)(5) (West Supp. 1980), and to waive
the public charge provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(15) (1976), regarding exclusion for those who
have been admitted as refugees under the new Act. 8 U.S.C.A. note § 1101 (West Supp. 1980).
54 42 U.S.C. § 1382(o (1976).
55 AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR NATIONALITIES SERVICE, 56 INTERPRETER RELEASES, June
22, 1979, at 301-02.
56 374 U.S. 449 (1963). In Fleuti the Court held that no entry had occurred where the
departure had been innocent, casual, and brief, and without an intent to depart in a manner
which can be regarded as meaningfully interruptive of the alien's permanent residence. Id. at
462.
57 In re Atanacio, A35391860 (Board of Immigration Appeals, Oct. 30, 1979). See AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR NATIONALITIES SERVICE, INTERPRETER RELEASES BULL., Nov. 8, 1979, at

515a.
58 In re Atanacio, A35391860 (Board of Immigration Appeals, Oct. 30, 1979). The returning resident had originally been sponsored by a daughter who had lost herjob. Upon being
hospitalized, he was advised by the hospital's social worker to apply for SSI. Id.
59 NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, IMMIGRATION NEWSLETTER, Jan.-April 1980, at 6; Letter

from William R. Tamayo, Attorney, Asian Law Caucus, to Maurice A. Roberts, Editor, INTERPRETER RELEASES (March 13, 1980) (copy on file at the North CarohnaJournalofInternationalLaw

and Commercial Regulation).
60 Id
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less made this decision a sound one. The INS guidelines and the Vallecer
agreement are still important, however, because an alien who relinquished SSI benefits for fear of losing his residency status in most cases
would be ineligible to regain them after the effective date of the Social
Security Disability Amendments of 198061 if he has been present in the
United States for less than three years.
In addition to the confusion and inequities engendered by conflicting policies between the Social Security Administration and the INS, an
even more important consideration is the potential for nationality dis62
crimination by means of selective enforcement of a restrictive policy.
According to the National Lawyers' Guild, of 450 aliens who were held
for deferred inspection because they were receiving SSI, all were Asian
and seventy percent were Filipino. 63 An explanation of why the number
of Filipinos involved in exclusion proceedings based on receipt of SSI is
so disproportionate, though necessarily lengthy, will elucidate the way
such nationality discrimination can arise.
Some of the anecdotes which circulated during the prolonged congressional debate on the SSI issue were stories about affluent Filipino
professionals who signed affidavits of support as part of their sponsorship
of elderly parents and then immediately proceded to put them on SSI.
INS immigration statistics for the years 1974-1977 also show a disproportionate number of elderly Filipino immigrants during these years as compared with other nationality groups or with Filipino immigration itself
prior to those years. 64 When viewed in an historical context, however, a
picture emerges which is significantly different from the image projected
by the "instant pension" anecdotes or by the immigration and welfare
figures alone. A careful case study of the Filipino experience indicates
that immigration patterns are dictated to a large extent by what our laws
allow. Where the laws have been discriminatory, the typical pattern can
become skewed so that the general public perceives a serious problem in
what is more accurately a logical product of evolution of the law.
From the Spanish cession in 1898 until final independence in 1946,
the Philippines was an American territory subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States. As American nationals, persons born in the Islands
could not be excluded from the United States under a general statute
relating to the exclusion of aliens. 65 With the Philippine Independence
61 42 U.S.C.A. § 1382j(a) (West Supp. 1980).

62 The classic case in this regard is Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), in which the
Supreme Court struck down a San Francisco ordinance regulating laundries which was enforced almost exclusively against Chinese. If it had been a national rather than a local law, the
result may well have been different.
63 Sop the INS Harassment of li'prno E/derly, NATIONAL LAWYERS GuILD, IMMIGRATION
NEWSLETTER, Jan.-April 1980, at 7.
64 D. North & J. Wagner, Immigration And Income Transfer Policies In The United
States: An Analysis Of A Non-Relationship, at 29-32 (August 1980) (Center for Labor and
Migration Studies, New TransCentury Foundation, Washington, D.C.).
65 Gonzalez v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1904).
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N.C.J.

INT'L

L. & COM. REG.

Act of 1934,66 however, the Philippines became foreign territory for immigration purposes, and a quota of fifty immigrant visas was set for each
fiscal year. No provision was made for the naturalization of Filipinos
present in the United States; instead, the Act specifically provided in section 14 that:
Upon the final and complete withdrawal of American sovereignty over
the Philippine Islands the immigration laws of the United States (including all the provisions thereof relating to persons ineligible to citizenship) shall apply to persons who were born in the Philippine
Islands to
67
the same extent as in the case of other foreign countries.

The intent was thus clear that upon complete
would come under the regular immigration and
cause the Immigration Act of 192468 generally
tion of persons ineligible for citizenship, the
especially important.

independence, Filipinos
naturalization laws. Be!
precluded the immigraright to naturalize was

The first naturalization statute in 1790 limited access to citizenship
through naturalization to free white persons. 69 Over the years the statute was modified to include other groups, and there was also considerable litigation to determine which groups would be classified as "white"
and which groups as "non-white. ' 70 At the time of the Philippine Independence Act, an unfavorable decision with regard to Filipinos had already been reached in 1925 when the Supreme Court decided Toyota v.
United States. 7 1 However, by the time full independence was achieved in
1946, World War II had intervened and many Filipinos had served with
U.S. forces or otherwise cooperated in the war effort. In appreciation of
these efforts, the law granting full independence also conferred the right
72
to naturalize.
Full independence brought not only the right to naturalization; it
also brought the Philippine Islands within the purview of the national
66 Act of March 24, 1934, ch. 84, § 8(a)(l), 48 Stat. 462 (repealed 1952).
67 ld § 14, 48 Stat. 464 (repealed 1952).
68 Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, § 13(c), 43 Stat. 162 (repealed 1952).

Act of March 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1,1Stat. 103 (repealed 1795).
INS Interpretations, 311. 1(a)(1).
71 268 U.S. 402 (1925).
72 Act of July 2, 1946, ch. 534, § 1, 60 Stat. 416 (repealed 1952). In addition, special
World War II legislation effectively allowed Filipinos who entered U.S. armed forces in the
Philippine Islands to become naturalized, and many took advantage of that opportunity prior
to the expiration of the pertinent statutory section in 1946. Act of March 27, 1942, ch. 199,
§ 1001, 56 Stat. 182, as amended by Act of Dec. 22, 1944, ch. 662, § 1, 58 Stat. 886, and Act of
Dec. 28, 1945, ch. 590, § l(c)(1), 59 Stat. 658 (repealed 1952). The special opportunity provided
by this legislation, although beneficial to many, did not produce the goodwill intended. In
order not to offend the Phillipine government, the INS withdrew facilities for nine months
during the pendency of the legislation, rejected applications, and advised potential applicants
not to apply. As a result, many persons were disappointed, and the legislation, although long
expired, has been the source of recent litigation. Olegario v. United States, 629 F.2d 204 (2d
Cir. 1980); In re Marcelo Enrile Inton, No. SA-79-CA-284 (W.D. Tex., July 3, 1980); In reNaturalization of 68 Filipino War Veterans, 406 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Cal. 1975). See AMERICAN
COUNCIL FOR NATIONALITIES SERVICE, 57 INTERPRETER RELEASES, Aug. 11, 1980, at 392-96.
69
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origins quota system as embodied in the Immigration Act of 1924, 73 and
thus doubled the annual quota from 50 to 100, the minimum number
allotted a country under that Act. Full independence, however, also
meant that Filipinos in this country who had not acquired citizenship
subject to the deporlost their status as noncitizen nationals and became
74
tation laws, laws which were frequently applied.
Fortunately, all racial bars to naturalization were eliminated with
the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. 75 Unfortunately this Act retained the national origins formula of the 1924 Act with
only minor changes so that a country's immigration quota continued to
be based on the number of inhabitants of that national origin present in
the continental United States in 1920.76 The bias built into this formula
is dramatically illustrated by comparing the minimum quota of 100 allocated to most Asian and African countries with the quotas allotted fa77
vored nations such as Great Britain (65,361) and Germany (25,814).
Furthermore, section 202 of the 1952 Act contained the cbntroversial
"Asia-Pacific Triangle" provision. 78 This provision stated that, while ordinarily persons were chargeable to the quota of the country of their
birth for immigration purposes, would-be immigrants attributable by as
much as one-half of their ancestry to a people or peoples indigenous to a
triangle (which included the Philippines) bounded by the meridians 600
E and 1650 W longitude and by the parallel 250 S latitude would be
charged to that area regardless of where they were born. 79 Because of an
exemption for immediate relatives, 0 the comparable term prior to 1965
being spouses and children of U.S. citizens,"' total immigration from an
Asiatic country during any fiscal year was not necessarily limited to the
quota number.82 Nevertheless, the "Asian-Pacific Triangle" provision
did serve to keep Asiatic immigration proportionately very low, including that from the Philippines which, for example, sent 3006 immigrants
to the United States in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1964.83 It is not
73 Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, § I I(a), 43 Stat. 150 (repealed 1952).
74 IA C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, at § 4.5d (1980).

75 Ch. 477, § 311, 66 Stat. 239 (1952) (codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1422 (1976)).
76 Id. § 201(a), 66 Stat. 175 (current version at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1151 (West 1970 & Supp.
1980)).
77 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, VISA OFFICE BULL. No. 139 (Feb. 1, 1965), reprited in AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR NATIONALITIES SERVICE, INTERPRETER RELEASES, Feb. 16, 1965, at 40-42.

78 Ch. 477, § 202(b), 66 Stat. 177 (1952) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1152(b) (1976)).
79 Id

80 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1976).
81 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 101(a)(27), 66 Stat. 169 (current
version at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27) (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
82 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH

SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,

U.S. IMMIGRATION

LAW AND POLICY: 1952-1979, at 24 (1979) (report prepared at the request of Senator Edward
M. Kennedy, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary). In fact, during the decade 1951-1960,
less than half of all immigrants were admitted under the quota system. This figure resulted not
only from the exemption for immediate relatives, but more from the special refugee programs
and the fact that the Western Hemisphere was excluded from the quota system at the time. Id.
83 IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION

SERVICE, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT
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surprising, therefore, that when the 1965 amendments instituting the
current preference system based primarily on family reunification were
passed,8 4 a substantial backlog of eligible Filipino immigrants had developed.8 5
In addition to family reunification, the 1965 amendments embodied
another principle which made that legislation the object of praise on the
part of its sponsors and apprehension on the part of its critics. That principle is found in section 2 and reads: "No person shall receive any preference or priority or be discriminated against in the issuance of an
immigration visa because of his race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or
place of residence ....
,"6 This most favored nation provision was applied in section 2 through a limitation of 20,000 immigrant visas that
could be issued to natives of any state during a fiscal year. A phase-in
period was established, however, which provided that up to and including June 30, 1968, the annual quota of each quota area would remain
the same as that which existed for the area on June 30, 1965.87 The
numbers unused by countries with large quotas, mainly England, Ireland, and Germany, would go into an immigration pool and would be
used to absorb oversubscribed preference categories. According to the
Visa Office, 55,568 such numbers would be available during the first
year of the new statute.8 8 However, so many countries had minimal quotas under the prior system that the immigration pool could not absorb
the demand, and thirty-three countries or dependencies, including the
Philippines, had preference categories that were oversubscribed, many as
far back as January, 1961, as soon as the new selection system went into
effect. 8 9 It was not until July 1, 1968 that the 20,000 per country limitation actually went into effect, and one or more preference categories for
the Philippines generally has been oversubscribed since that time.
Because immigration had been severly restricted for Filipinos, the
preference category most available to would-be Filipino immigrants
under the 1965 amendments initally was not one based on family reunification but was the third preference, which provided that ten percent of
the available visa numbers be made available to "qualified immigrants
who are members of the professions . . . ."9 From Fiscal Year 1971
until Fiscal Year 1974, the INS Annual Reports show the Philippines to
Table 2 (1964), rep nled n AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR NATIONALITIES SERVICE, 42 INTERPRETER RELEASES, Feb. 23, 1965, at 51.
84 Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 1, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended in 8
U.S.C.A. § 1151(a)-(b) (West 1970 & Supp. 1980)).
85 Set note 77 supra.
86 8 U.S.C.A. § 1152(a) (West Supp. 1980).
87 Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 1(c), 79 Stat. 911 (repealed 1976).
88 AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR NATIONALITIES SERVICE, 42 INTERPRETER RELEASES, Nov.
10, 1965, at 42.
89 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, VISA OFFICE BULLETIN No. 152 (Nov. 10, 1965), reprnted n
AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR NATIONALITIES SERVICE, 42 INTERPRETER RELEASES, Nov. 18,
1965, at 358-61.
90 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(3) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).

UNEQUAL PROTECTION

13

be one of the few countries from which admissions based on occupation
consistently outnumbered those based on family relationship. 9' From
Fiscal Year 1974 on, the pattern is reversed and admissions based on
family relationship outnumber those based on occupation. 9 2 The switch
corresponds to the period during which the first large numbers of immi93
grants under the increased quota became eligible for naturalization.
In conformance with this changed pattern, the number of elderly
Filipinos admitted as immediate relatives because they are the parents of
U.S. citizens has also increased. 94 Many of these persons undoubtedly
would have come years earlier had they not been effectively excluded by
means of severely restricted quotas. The increased immigration and
naturalization figures since 1968 indicate that many of the sponsors
themselves must be relatively recent arrivals who are just becoming established. Even for those who are comfortably situated, however, the
entitlement conferred by the INA that adult U.S. citizens rgay reunite in
this country with their alien parents is a hollow one because medical
insurance for elderly persons not eligible for medicare is virtually impossible to obtain 95 and because, in many states, medicaid is a companion
program to SSI. Given the small number of persons involved, attempts
to exclude returning lawful permanent residents who receive SSI and the
recent law requiring that a sponsor's income and resources be deemed to
the alien must be viewed as efforts to achieve in a more subtle way what
is no longer possible to accomplish through laws which openly discriminate on the basis of race or national origin: the restriction of immigration by selected groups.
Another pattern which has developed recently as a logical result of
U.S. immigration policies is one of the increasing number of Latin American women coming to this country in advance of their families. 96 Because of policies that permit labor certifications to be granted for
91 IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORTS

Table 7A (1971-1973). Filipino immigration under the relative preference categories for fiscal
years 1971-1973 was 8,174, 8,097, and 8,296, respectively. Under the occupational preference
category for the same years it was 10,970, 10,972, and 11,582. Id. The latter pattern has continued since that time and is the more typical one, with most countries sending an even greater
proportion of their immigrants under the relative categories.
92 Id

(1974-1978).

93 In fact, the naturalization figures for Filipinos for Fiscal Years 1973 and 1974 show a
dramatic increase from 8,149 in the former year to 13,573 in the latter, a jump of almost 67%.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORTS Table

39 (1973-1974). The number of naturalizations has continued to climb at a slower, but steady
pace since that year. Id (1975-1978).
94 Id. Table 6A (1974-1978).
95 An informal telephone survey of eight insurance companies in early 1980 revealed that
none of the companies surveyed would provide medical insurance to an elderly alien who had
recently come to this country.
96 L. COHEN, CULTURE, DISEASE, AND STRESS AMONG LATINO IMMIGRANTS 64-72

(1979).

14

N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

household employment 9 7 these women are able to obtain sixth preference immigrant visas. 98 Once here they begin the slow process of reuniting their families in this country. 99 It will be very interesting to see
whether in a few years the immigration statistics begin to show larger
numbers of elderly Latin American immigrants as compared with the
elderly arriving from other countries. Because many of these women
have limited education and technical and language skills, their opportunities for economic advancement will also be limited. If it were not for
the 1980 amendments, one would expect to see an increase in the use of
SSI among this group in the same manner as with the Filipinos, especially since employment opportunities for the first generation will frequently be limited to low wage jobs.
It,
should be noted at this point that deeming a sponsor's income and
resources to an alien for purposes of SSI eligibility serves a legitimate
function to the extent that it identifies persons who truly can afford to
support elderly or disabled relatives. Indeed, the law presently requires
that in making an SSI eligibility determination for an individual, the
income and resources of a spouse must be deemed to the applicant.t°° If
the individual is a child, the income and resources of the parent(s) are
deemed.' 0 ' In both cases, waivers may be obtained in those instances
where deeming is "determined by the Secretary to be inequitable under
the circumstances."' 0 2 If the objection is to conserve scarce financial resources while ensuring aid to those most in need, then the deeming principle should also be applied to citizens with adult children capable of
supporting them. In all instances, safeguards should be provided to protect those elderly persons who are abandoned or neglected by their adult
children. One obvious safeguard would be to set the income eligibility
standard at a level which promotes family integration rather than disintegration, something not accomplished by the formula adopted in the
Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980 with regard to aliens.
Under that formula, an alien sponsored by a family of four would begin
to have income deemed to him or her at the level of approximately
97 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1976) provides that aliens coming to the U.S. to perform skilled
or unskilled labor are ineligible for visas,
unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the Secretary of
State and the Attorney General that (A) there are not sufficient workers who are
able, willing, qualified, . . . and available at the time of application for a visa
and admission to the United States and at the place where the alien is to perform
such skilled or unskilled labor, and (B) the employment of such aliens will not
adversely affect the wages and working conditions of the workers in the United
States similarly employed.
98 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(6) (Supp. IH1978) provides that ten percent of the annual quota of
visa numbers be made available "to qualified immigrants who are capable of performing specified skilled or unskilled labor, not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which a shortage of
employable and willing persons exists in the United States."
99 L. COHEN, supra note 96.
100 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(0(1) (1976).
10142 U.S.C.A. § 1382c(0(2) (West Supp. 1980).
102 42 U.S.C.A. § 1382c(0(1)-(2) (West 1970 & Supp. 1980).
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$7,140. A complete phaseout of benefits would occur at approximately
$10,230 except in those states which provide a supplement to the federal
payment. In such cases the sponsoring family's annual income could
thus exceed $10,230 by the amount of the supplement before phaseout
occurred. 10 3 Such low levels do not identify the truly affluent.
In contrast, just two months prior to the enactment of this restrictive
formula as part of the 1980 amendments Congress passed the Refugee
Act of 1980.104 It provides for the annual admission of 50,000 refugees
through fiscal year 1982.105 If, after consultation with Congress, the
President decides that there is a need, a greater number of refugees may
be admitted.' 0 6 After fiscal year 1982, the entire number of refugee admissions will be determined through a consultation process.10 7 The Act
further authorizes reimbursement to states for up to 100% of the cash
assistance and medical assistance provided to any refugee during. the
thirty-six month period after arrival. 0 8 At the same time, however, recently arrived immigrants are now virtually ineligible for such assistance
during the same time period if they are sponsored by a U.S. citizen.
Without the possibility of help except under extreme conditions, many
citizens will delay or forgo reuniting their families for fear that if unanticipated circumstances change their economic situation, that situation
will be made more difficult by the presence of additional family members.
Inconsistencies of the kind described above have policy implications
far beyond the few individuals whose lives are directly affected. 10 9 There
are implications for refugee resettlement, for the principle of family reunion upon which the 1965 amendments to the INA are based, and for the
whole community as one group perceives another to be favored while it is
the object of discrimination. Furthermore, these broad questions of equity are not going to disappear in the near future. Instead, they will
become increasingly difficult, especially if access to other programs is also
restricted; and, there undoubtedly will be pressures for such restrictions.
Today's refugees will become tomorrow's citizens. If these refugees find
103 Telephone conversation with Allen Jensen, Professional Staff Assistant, Subcommittee
on Public Assistance and Unemployment Compensation, House Ways and Means Committee,
November 10, 1980. The exact workings of the deeming provision must await regulations which
will implement section 504 of the new law, see note 48 supra, by amending subparts J, K, and L
of 20 CFR § 416. A Notice of Decision to Develop Regulations was published in 45 Fed. Reg.
75,225 (1980).
104 Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (to be codified in scatered sections of 8, 22
U.S.C.).
105 8 U.S.C.A. § 1157(a)(1) (West Supp. 1980).
106 Id
107 Id § 1157(a)(2).

108 Id

§ 1522(e).

From Sept. 15, 1978 through May 1979, SSI payments were awarded to 17,900 aliens,
14,100 of whom were admitted under the regular immigration procedures. Most of the remaining 3,800 were refugees. Kennedy and Schmulowitz, SSI Payments lo Lawfully Resident Als,
1978-79, in SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY BULL. 3-4 (March 1980).
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that family reunification is possible only after naturalization, they also
may well find themselves being held to a higher standard for reunification than would be the case if they still retained refugee status. In addition, amnesty is being seriously considered for many, if not all, of the
unknown number of illegal aliens currently present in the country.' 10 If
an amnesty is declared, will needy beneficiaries of such a program be
eligible for assistance while legal immigrants whose sponsors have suffered financial reverses are not? To legislate an amnesty the beneficiaries
of which would be ineligible for assistance programs would produce additional complications because the courts have already said that deportable persons against whom INS has chosen not to proceed are here under
color of law and are therefore eligible to receive assistance.", Some of
these problems were alluded to by Representative Barber Conable (RN.Y.), ranking Republican on the House Ways and Means Committee at
the time that the conference report on the 1980 Amendments was passed
by the House:
I must say, the fact that we are clamping down here illustrates the disarray we have relative to the issue of immigrants in this country. If we are
permitting a flood of immigrants to come in without sponsors and with-

out any careful screening, it is an interesting commentary that those who
are backed by responsible people are now being held to a much tighter
standard than previously by this provision. I think the provision is entirely appropriate, but it is obvious that we have got to get our whole
refugee and immigrant policy in better shape than it is, or we are going
to have massive contradictions similar to this incurring from the influx
of Cubans in Florida taking place at the same time, by agreement and
by widespread approval, when we are tightening the requirements
made
2
of immigrants who are sponsored into this country."1

The passage of both the Refugee Act and the Social Security Disability Amendments within two months of each other vividly illustrates
the degree to which our society is responding to contradictory social philosophies. The questions of equity raised by denying benefits to some
groups and not to others in turn raise the issue as to whether the time has
come to reconsider the usefulness of the legal dichotomy which has developed between state and national laws regarding aliens and equal protection, certainly to the extent that it goes beyond the area of immigration
per se. As mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court, in Mathews v. Diaz,
pointed out that the curtailing of benefits to immigrants pursuant to the
federal government's plenary powers can act as a deterrent to immigration. As the Filipino experience illustrates, however, the immigration
pattern which produces the need for assistance can be a logical outgrowth of the immigration law itself. The fact that the due process
clause of the fifth amendment and the equal protection clause of the
110 SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, NEWSLETTER No. 13,
at 3 (Jan. 1981).
I"' See Holley v. Lavine, 553 F.2d 845, 849 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub. nom. Shang v.

Holley, 435 U.S. 947 (1978).
112 126 CONG. REC. H3975 (daily ed. May 22, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Conable).
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fourteenth amendment are not interchangeable phrases, however, has
enabled Congress to partially shift the costs of U.S. immigration policies
from the pocket of the government to that of the immigrants themselves.
When the shift of these costs is made to the pockets of those who
have been discriminated against by prior law, it becomes especially unfair. While the Filipino experience has been used as an example, immigrants from some other countries have shown a similar pattern. One
study has found that, overall, forty-two percent of the noncitizen
awardees had lived in the United States before 1974. From seven countries, however, less than twenty percent had been U.S. residents that
long.1 13 Of those seven, five (Korea, Turkey, China, India, and the Philippines) had been subjected to severely restricted immigration either by
the "Asian Pacific Triangle" provision or the national origins quota.
The other two areas, the Soviet Union and Indochina, are, of course, the
home of a large percentage of recently arrived refugees.
When access to public benefits is denied or restricted, not only are
the costs being shifted to the pockets of the immigrants, but in many
cases to the pockets of those least able to afford the costs. Almost all laws
and policies involve making a trade-off decision in which the benefits to
be gained must be weighed against the foreseeable problems. Certainly
it must be obvious that a social phenomenon as complex as immigration
will have drawbacks as well as advantages. If a policy decision is made
that the United States will benefit by allowing persons to enter on the
basis of their professional expertise or their occupational skill and that it
is also in the interest of the country to allow family reunification, then
the costs associated with such policies should also be accepted. Nevertheless, because the national antidiscrimination policies and the constitutional safeguards which ensure them have bypassed U.S. immigration
laws, Congress, with the help of the courts, is able to shift responsibility
for some of the drawbacks to the immigrants themselves. As discussed,
the source of this ability is found in the plenary powers of Congress over
immigration. With Mathews v. Diaz, these powers have been extended
beyond the boundaries of immigration into the area of public benefit
programs. As a result, it is time to reexamine to what extent these powers are actually plenary and unrestricted by constitutional prohibitions.
Indeed, if the United States is to be a truly pluralistic society in which all
groups are treated equally under the law, then this reexamination must
take place.

113 Kennedy and Schmulowitz, supra note 109, at 5.

